This year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, yet we are witnessing an increasing number of attempts to reinterpret historical events and undermine the legacy of the National Liberation Struggle (NOB), while a stronger and more systematic institutional response to pseudo-scientific revisionism is missing. This was the conclusion of the discussion on the latest episode of Građanski ugao (Civic Angle), a show produced by the Centre for Civic Education (CCE) and aired on TV E. The discussion led by Zvezdana Kovač, CCE’s Strategy and Outreach Director, featured film director Branko Baletić, historian Milan Šćekić, political scientist from the Human Rights Action (HRA) Elizabeta Mrnjačević, and analyst Stefan Đukić.
Milan Šćekić believes that this is a long-lasting situation, dating back to the 1979 global economic crisis. “As economic crisis deepens, political crises follow, creating fertile ground for manipulation”, he explained, adding that revisionism escalated in the 1990s and cannot be stopped. “On the contrary”, Šćekić adds, “it seems that certain centres are deliberately promoting it, with media reinforcing these narratives. In a society like Montenegro, we lack the mechanisms to counter this effectively.”
Stefan Đukić considers this an acute situation, “because when people talk about revisionism, they think of World War II and the rehabilitation of collaborators with the occupiers”. However, he emphasized that revisionism is much broader, citing examples of “twisting” the truth about things we all witness in real-time, demonstrating how easy it is to manipulate historical perspectives over time.
Branko Baletić argues that we are witnessing “creeping revisionism, not the kind that seeks to change the perspective on an event or a period, but rather small insinuations, almost insignificant details or personal experiences that some individuals use to change the general scientific consensus.” He recognizes this creeping revisionism even in certain attempts to do something positive, such as the initiative to correct historical injustices regarding the Goli Otok prison and establish the truth. “Any rational person would agree that those who were unjustly persecuted and tortured, without court verdicts, deserve justice. However, we can only have an informed discussion about this if we thoroughly understand all historical aspects of the Informbiro phenomenon”, he explains.
Elizabeta Mrnjačević pointed out the difference between scientific and pseudo-scientific revisionism, which is based on falsification. “Negative historical revisionism in Montenegro has become uniform. For three decades, we have witnessed historical revisionism concerning Montenegro’s role in the wars of the 1990s. A state-sponsored narrative was built to claim that Montenegro did not participate in those wars. Since the political shift in 2020, we have seen a new wave of historical revisionism imported from Serbia”, she noted.
When asked whether modern revisionist efforts share common characteristics and are easily recognizable, Šćekić says that he clearly recognizes it, even when it is presented in a sophisticated manner, because he is a historian. He also highlighted that revisionist content is now predominantly spread through social media, where it has significant influence, while education system remains ill-equipped to counter it. “For example, if TikTok circulates an image of a war criminal, say a Chetnik with Bosnian Muslims, the intended takeaway is that the Chetnik movement was friendly toward Muslim communities. However, if that same figure is shown alongside German officers or occupying forces, it is suddenly dismissed as a ‘communist fabrication,” he explained.
Baletić further argued that revisionism is not always easy to detect, particularly in its more subtle forms. He cited the example of a historian who, while speaking about the Battle of Belgrade, chose to describe the event by saying that the Partisans “occupied” Belgrade. “That single word—’occupied’ – completely alters the historical context,” Baletić noted.
Stefan Đukić explains that some stories easily “roll” and lead in the opposite direction. “For example, the story begins with the claim that the partisans committed a crime, and ends up with the idea that the collaborators were the good guys. It starts from something that wasn’t talked about enough, and you end up with what is actually your goal”, he specifies.
Elizabeta Mrnjačević assesses that revisionism is politically motivated with the intent to undermine the principles on which the Montenegrin identity is based – anti-fascism and the anti-war movement. “They are undermining the foundations of the secular anti-fascist tradition to make room for ideological constructions that would serve as the foundation for this new Montenegro”, she says.
“A society that has the experience of 1918 cannot allow today’s political situation”, warns Baletić. “Here, the ground is very fertile for spreading half-truths and incomprehensible constructs without analytical reflection. We have never clarified certain things, so all the camps of the 1990s have happened again, just with different peoples, on both sides of the border. It’s as if there is no discourse based on historical facts”, he explains.
On the thesis that there are two types of nationalism in Montenegro – the ephemeral Montenegrin and the omnipresent Serbian, Šćekić says: “If we accept the thesis that there is Montenegrin nationalism, then it was born from Greater Serbian nationalism… because in Montenegro, there are no elements that define nationalism… Montenegro would still be a Serbian Sparta today if it weren’t for 1918”, he asserts. He also reminds that in that year, 95% of the population was in favor of uniting with Serbia, and only 5% wanted to discuss the modalities, i.e., for Montenegro to have a certain name in that Yugoslavia, which cannot be defined as nationalism, but that injustice birthed the perception of Montenegrin nationalism. He stresses that the fact that “we are a nation with state-building experience, with state-building consciousness and tradition, should not make us be regarded as nationalists and separatists.”
Referring to events defined as “the people’s movements” (Kosovo, the Dubrovnik “adventure,” and the liturgies), Baletić says that “it’s true that those nationalist and hysterical movements came from abroad, but we – the Montenegrins – did it. Even though it was part of Greater Serbian nationalism, we were the ones executing it. Whenever Montenegro, defending itself, ventured outside its territory in different periods, it always ended in catastrophe. This can also be interpreted, especially from the perspective of those who felt endangered, as part of Montenegrin nationalism.” However, Šćekić argues that Montenegrins did not go to Dubrovnik as Montenegrin nationalists, adding that those same nationalists shouted “From Lovćen, the villa cries, forgive us, Dubrovnik.” Baletić clarified that he was referring to how the outside world views us and how it might speak about the Montenegrin nationalist movement.
Šćekić and Đukić are of the opinion that Montenegrin and Serbian nationalism, like any nationalism in the world, cannot be compared. As Đukić points out, this thesis appeared in Montenegrin society in 2019–2020, when the president of the country and his party were defined as a fundamentally nationalist party. “We perceive nationalism as something fundamentally bad, so people avoid admitting that they are nationalists or have nationalist tendencies because we have a problem with the undefined concept of ‘civil ’”, explains Đukić. He also argues that “a civic identity cannot define itself by what it is but rather by what it is not, and that is a failure of society as a whole.”
When asked what civil society is doing and how institutions are reacting to numerous reactions regarding examples of historical revisionism, Mrnjačević assessed that institutions have failed in raising citizens’ awareness about the principles and everything that underpins our identity. “Institutions have not created a defense mechanism against anomalies such as historical revisionism.” She reminded of an example where HRA and partner NGOs addressed the Ministry of Culture and Media regarding the illegal renaming of streets in Pljevlja, which are being named after participants in the 1990s wars, an action that should have been preceded by the Ministry’s approval. “The Municipality of Pljevlja believes that such approval is not needed, and we have not received a response from the Ministry of Culture and Media. Also, we have been unable to get documentation regarding the monument to Amfilohije for five months”, she explained.
Baletić argues that nationalism in Montenegro starts from the top, from political structures and quasi-scientific performances promoted by media that support it. He points to the fact that along the “northern municipalities” line, citizens seem to not know in which country they live, as the flag of another state is displayed, and there has been no intervention from the government to suspend it.
Regarding changes in history textbooks due to political pressures, Šćekić stated that every government seeks to shape history books to fit its own narrative, and the new government will likely want attempt to do the same. However, he expresses skepticism about the educational system’s ability to impose a uniform way of thinking on everyone.
“Our children are not learning about the wars of the 1990s and the breakup of Yugoslavia”, said Mrnjačević, to which Šćekić disagreed. “They do learn”, she responded, “but they are not learning about Montenegro’s role in those wars. It is essential that they are taught facts, but for example, our textbooks do not mention that genocide was committed in Srebrenica, and we have a problem with children because politicians relativize that event”, she emphasized.
Đukić argued that our education system needs “a method for effectively using available information – everything else is secondary.”
The full episode is available at the link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4M78KOJ3zec
Maja Marinović, Program Associate