For most ethnic Montenegrins, the year 1918 rightly evokes negative emotions. Although exhausted by the Balkan Wars, Montenegro mobilized its army at the end of July 1914, expressing solidarity with Serbia before any other European state, and fought for about eighteen months on the side of the Allies during the First World War. It was among only eight European countries that in the summer of 1914 took part in a war that would eventually become a global conflict of unprecedented scale. Yet, by the will of the Allies in 1918, independent Montenegro ceased to exist, replaced by the newly created Yugoslav state — the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
Montenegro entered this new state as part of Serbia, and through the decisions of the Podgorica Assembly in November 1918, King Nikola and the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty, which had ruled Montenegro for over two centuries,were dethroned. Thus, unlike other European countries that had fought on the side of the Entente powers and mostly continued to exist as independent states after the war, Montenegro was denied that right. It is therefore understandable that, for most ethnic Montenegrins, the mention of 1918 provokes resentment – a sentiment best captured in recent years by the slogan “Never again 1918!”, coined by a Montenegrin historian.
While the majority of ethnic Montenegrins today primarily feel regret for the state that disappeared after the First World War – a sentiment understandable given their traditionally state-oriented (etatist) outlook – the paradox is that had 1918 not happened, Montenegrins would, in all likelihood, still predominantly identify as Serbs today, and Montenegro would probably be the second Serbian state in the Balkans. For generations, Montenegrins were raised in the Serbian spirit -not merely as Serbs, but as elite Serbs. The greatest promoter and enforcer of this ideal of “elite Serbdom” was Prince (later King) Nikola I Petrović Njegoš, who achieved what no other Serbian ruler before him had: he convinced certain former Catholic tribes and Albanians that they were Serbs – and not ordinary ones, but the best among them. Therefore, even if the Allies had allowed King Nikola to return to Montenegro, and even if Montenegro had continued as an independent state after 1918, the character of that state would undoubtedly have been Serbian.
However, due to the unwise actions of the Serbian authorities and the violence that they and their supporters committed for years in Montenegro against those who opposed unconditional unification, it was precisely the Serbs who contributed most to the process of de-Serbization of Montenegro and the national emancipation of Montenegrins after 1918. By the way in which they carried out unification, they deeply offended, humiliated, and wounded the very people who in 1914 had been the first to take up arms to defend an attacked Serbia.
This is confirmed by the recollection of a well-known Montenegrin communist, who later wrote about how unification was imposed: “Beating, and even torture of prisoners, up to bomb conspiracies rare in Montenegro, became overnight common practice – with the escalation of civil war and the introduction of the Serbian police order. And although this was formally prohibited, it was widely done – public beatings with fists and rifle butts were the only visible acts. It seemed as though there was some manic passion in beating precisely Montenegrins, who were more sensitive to this than to long imprisonment or the heaviest fines, even execution itself. Moreover, with the new authorities there emerged the idea that the most important thing was to humiliate the opponent and that such conduct somehow proved loyalty and firmness, so policemen, even those who were privately against such methods, competed with each other – careful only not to cripple the accused and to keep everything within their own circle so it would not reach the newspapers or parliament. And if a rebellion broke out somewhere, the lawlessness of the police was taken lightly, even seen as a virtue.”
Given the terror imposed in Montenegro after 1918, it is understandable that many Montenegrins increasingly distanced themselves from Serbian identity and began to emphasize their Montenegrin one. Among those who recognized the injustice inflicted upon Montenegro were even the children of supporters of unconditional unification and participants of the Podgorica Assembly.
Through the violence it exercised, the Serbian government persistently worked against its own interests and unnecessarily provoked resentment among Montenegrins – a fact noted even by the commander of the Adriatic troops,who reported: “At first, we were welcomed in Montenegro with enthusiasm; all that was needed was a bit more tact to maintain that enthusiasm.” However, since the new authorities did not act wisely or tactfully towards Montenegrins, after the Christmas Uprising was suppressed, the commander of the Adriatic troops regretfully reported that in Montenegro “dissatisfaction with Serbia is widespread because all hopes have been disappointed: both political and economic.” Moreover, he added that the authorities lacked authority, that even opponents of King Nikola’s regime were embittered by the government’s actions, and that if conditions did not change, “the idea of union with Serbia will undoubtedly be called into question.”
But did it have to be this way? Had there been wisdom among the Serbian leadership – of course not. Especially given that in 1918 an overwhelming majority of Montenegrins supported unification with Serbia. When there is massive popular support for unification, only an unwise government would issue orders of a “police nature” to its officers “not to have soft hearts while working in Montenegro,” to forbid the Montenegrin king’s return at any cost, to marginalize King Nikola’s supporters, and to use violence and heavy-handed tactics against a population that had “welcomed them with enthusiasm.” Had they acted more wisely, the Serbs could have allowed the Montenegrins the freedom of choice – to decide for themselves whether to unite with them and join the new Yugoslav state or not. Given the overwhelming public sentiment in favour of unification, Montenegrins would almost certainly have chosen union with Serbia. In that case, no one could have accused Serbia of having imposed unification by force, and the Christmas Uprising likely would not have occurred, since the decision to unite would have been made freely by the Montenegrins themselves. But these are, of course, counterfactual reflections.
As historians do not deal with what might have been, but with what actually happened, the fact remains that after 1918, the Serbs lost the sympathy of many Montenegrins, precisely because of the decision of the Serbian authorities to impose unification with Montenegro at any cost. Therefore, the unification of Montenegro with Serbia in 1918 was not the epochal concept that some historians claim, but rather the greatest defeat of the Serbian idea in Montenegro. Moreover, unlike King Nikola, who taught his subjects to see themselves as elite Serbs, this process unfolded through the very violence that the Serbian authorities and their supporters carried out against opponents of unconditional unification. The irony of history is that it was the Serbs who nationally awakened the inhabitants of the Black Mountains and taught them to become Montenegrins. And that, undoubtedly, is the most positive outcome of the 1918 unification.
Dr. Milan Šćekić, Historian and Research Associate, University of Donja Gorica (UDG)