Across the Western Balkans, the delegitimisation of antifascism and the denial of the AVNOJ borders echo through the political and religious structures of the region. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), particularly during the 1990s, became an important actor of nationalist policies and the relativisation of crimes. The consequences of these policies still shape societies in the region today – collaborators with fascists are receiving recognition and public symbols, while anti-fascist values are being marginalised, as highlighted in the PROUDCAST of the Centre for Civic Education (CCE).
Discussing clerical nationalism as a regional challenge to democracy, the instrumentalisation of the trust enjoyed by religious communities, and secularism as a precondition for civil liberties, programme associate at the CCE, Željka Zvicer, spoke with Izabela Kisić, sociologist from Serbia, Slađana Kavarić-Mandić, researcher and activist from Montenegro, and Vukašin Milićević, theologian from Serbia.
Slađana Kavarić-Mandić argues that secularism does not by itself guarantee democracy, which, as she puts in, must also be questioned based on the outcomes it has produced. “In Montenegro you have an example where right-wing parties, pro-fascist parties, guided by Europe’s democratic achievements, specifically the Resolution of the European Parliament on European conscience and totalitarianism, are revising history and questioning the foundation of our societies – antifascism,” she stated.
Izabela Kisić offered a different perspective, emphasising that secularism is a precondition for genuine democracy. “Wherever the church or religious communities are fused with the state, there is no democracy. Religious communities are, by nature, authoritarian. The SOC is an authoritarian community; it is, in fact, the most closed institution in the region. It is non-transparent and the one which speaks against democratic principles and against human rights, and human rights are the foundation of democracy,” Kisić underscored.
Vukašin Milićević pointed out that democracy is inseparable from the principles of a state of social justice, but the issue in the region is that it emerged on the wave of nationalistic anti-communism. “The driving fuel of nationalisms is religion. When we talk about church elites – they are part of political elites. Take the example of Serbia and Croatia, as two different traditions. Identical mechanisms, identical vocabulary, identical scandalous, destructive, grotesque cultures of remembrance concerning WWIIand the recent wars,” Milićević explained.
Kavarić-Mandić describes the influence of the church in Montenegro as direct. “We live a reality of complete interconnectedness between political elites and the church, and they have no problem with that, they do not hide it. This interference of the church in the state is very clear. We could see this through the recent event in Berane, during the installation of a monument to Pavle Đurišić, where we saw that the church and the leaders of right-wing political parties were in agreement – both regarding that act and regarding the interpretation of the symbolism of Pavle Đurišić, including the anathematisation of the communist movement, that is, the quasi-socialism in which we lived,” she noted.
“What I, from the left, notice is that the left in Montenegro has no response whatsoever. Firstly, the left in Montenegro is not unified, it is very unsolidary, fragmented and driven by interests. Therefore, it is lacking unified response and discourse, or concept on which it bases its activism. Apart from individual good examples, the left has been reduced to the keyboard activism and press releases,” Kavarić-Mandić elaborated.
Izabela Kisić assessed that the situation in Serbia is similar. “In the 1980s, Serbia did not enter processes of democratisation. On the contrary, it entered anti-emancipatory processes and wars. And the church played an enormous, even leading, role there; the church then became the servant of nationalism. And if we consider whether the church influences power or the power in Serbia influences the church – they act in unison,” Kisić said.
Kisić finds it encouraging that the student protests, which have lasted for a year in Serbia, do not have a dominant religious undertone, although symbols of the extreme right spectrum can also be seen there.
“Students are precisely bringing back to the scene that constitutional patriotism, where all citizens are equal regardless of their religion and ethnicity. What is seen on the streets, those scenes when we have young people of Muslim faith and young Christians hugging and going together into the same struggle – that, in fact, frustrates those in power and church leadership,” said Izabela Kisić.
Speaking about reconciliation in the region, Vukašin Milićević argued that it cannot be built gradually. “Reconciliation requires radical methods. There is nothing gradual there. What gradual? That we gradually understand that genocide occurred in Srebrenica. Or, gradually that the Croatian public accepts the fact that the treatment of civilians in the Independent State of Croatiawas genocide of enormous proportions. I do not see how that can happen step by step,” he stated.
The interlocutors also reflected on the role of both religious and political elites in undermining anti-fascist values.
“We have an acute problem with anti-fascism, because the current government in Montenegro and the church see anti-fascism as the main problem, and they reduce anti-fascism to communism. And, of course, you can criticise communism, speak of communist crimes and critically re-examine that system which collapsed. However, that system rested on five years of struggle in the woods for universal values. So, you can dispute the system born after the partisan struggle, but you cannot dispute the values which are the foundation of that struggle,” argued Kavarić-Mandić.
“When the Communist Party initiated that struggle, it was a small, illegal party, scattered and under repression. However, what is the essence of the delegitimisation of anti-fascism? The delegitimisation of the AVNOJ borders, because precisely entering the war meant the negation of the AVNOJ borders and the creation of Greater Serbia. And that was the key, that is still the key, why anti-fascism is so discredited, and all the other movements that collaborated with the fascists are receiving monuments, etc. And the church played a major ideological role in the 1980s and Milošević capitalized on it,” Izabela Kisić recalled.
The roots of this, Vukašin Milićević explains, reach back to the period between the two World Wars. “The German Reich invested heavily in intelligence ties with the SOC. Entire departments within the Reich’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs handled religious affairs. When it comes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, they focused on the SOC, because they considered it a serious ally in the fight against communism. On the other hand, the ideological basis for this came from numerous Russian churchmen who, after the October Revolution, arrived in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovens, later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and brought with them a range of influential, and the most conservative, ideas which incorporated anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories,” Milićević stated.
The speakers assessed that education and its reform are crucial for the emancipation of societies in the region.
The full PROUDCAST is available at: https://youtu.be/EUWVQ1QP8H8
This PROUDCAST was produced within the REGIONAL PLENUM 2025 – Cracks in Democracy: Nationalism and Clericalism in the Western Balkans, organised by the CCE, the Regional Academy for Democratic Development (ADD), the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Sarajevo, and the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The content of the episode is the sole responsibility of the speakers.
Maja Marinović, programme associate