In short, the significance of Péter Magyar’s victory lies in the fall of Viktor Orbán.
The outcome of the elections in Hungary does not merely represent a change of government in one European Union member state; it confirms that even long-standing systems with pronounced autocratic elements are not invincible. The maxim that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” has once again been validated by the fall of a regime that for a long time believed in its own untouchability.
What awaits Hungary after 16 years of systematic erosion of the rule of law, weakening of institutions, and marginalization of independent media is, at this moment, less important for us. Far more important is what this change means for the European Union and how it reflects on the region.
It is evident that the European Union has freed itself from one of its most persistent internal obstructors. For years, Hungary blocked or slowed down key European policies – from sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine to the enlargement process – often openly flirting with Russian interests and, as analysts note, ending up on the “European back bench.”
When it comes to the Western Balkans, this change most directly affects the regime in Serbia and serves as a kind of “litmus test” for democracy there. A country in which Aleksandar Vučić has for years been building a system marked with similar patterns of concentrated power and media control is now losing an important political protector within the EU. This narrows the space for balancing between Brussels and Moscow, as well as for avoiding the political consequences of such a policy. Although it is too early to expect a direct electoral effect, it is clear that the regime in Belgrade will operate under more complex circumstances, without an ally that until recently mitigated pressure and absorbed criticism.
Reactions from Serbia already reflect this and, at the very least, indicate discomfort. Media spin, caricaturing of opponents, and attempts to downplay the significance of the change resemble a situation in which the orchestra continues to play while the ship is already taking on water. Because the relationship with Hungary was not only a matter of foreign policy, but also a model – a signal that such a political system could endure within the EU. That signal is now gone.
What is important for Serbia is also important for Montenegro, given that part of its governing structure follows similar political patterns and ideological matrices. Although geographically distant, Hungary was politically closer and more influential than it might have seemed. Even when such influence was not formally articulated, the mere perception of its potential use carried political weight. As an ally of Vučić, Orbán could, formally or informally, influence the dynamics of enlargement. In a regional context in which it does not suit Serbia for Montenegro to become the next EU member state, such a possibility was not negligible. Orbán’s fall is therefore, at least on a psychological level, good news for Montenegro as well.
As for the broader global impact of the change of power in Hungary and whether this marks the beginning of the weakening of far-right trends in Europe, it is still too early for conclusions. While some may initially be inclined toward optimism, it should be noted that Péter Magyar does not come from the liberal centre, but from the centre-right political spectrum. Still, one thing is certain – political cycles are not closed. Even in systems that appear stable and controlled, voters ultimately find a way to make their voices heard.
And that may be the most important message for Europe and for us.
Zvezdana Kovač, Strategy and Outreach Director at the Centre for Civic Education (CCE)